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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-IMMOVABLE PROPERTY EXCEPTION OF THE FOR-
EIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976-Asociacion de Reclamantes
v. United Mexican States'
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a foreign sovereign was immune from suit in the
courts of the United States regardless of the suit's basis.2 This absolute
theory of sovereign immunity remained in effect until the 1950's when
a more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was espoused.3 Diffi-
culties arose, however, in applying this restrictive theory4 and as a re-
sult, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761
(FSIA).
The FSIA is founded on the general premise that a foreign sover-
eign is immune from jurisdiction of the United States courts6 and then
proceeds to establish exceptions7 to this general rule.8 One exception
that has rarely been invoked, and is the focus of this comment, is the
exception for cases concerning rights to immovable property situated
1. 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
This case involved the issue of ownership of a public vessel taken under orders of Napo-
leon, Emperor of France, from citizens of the United States. Id. at 117. The Court held
that a public vessel of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States coming into its
ports, and demeaning itself in a friendly manner, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the
United States. Id. at 146.
3. See infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
4. Id.
5. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)) [hereinafter
FSIA].
6. H.R. REP. No. 1479, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6616-21 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Sovereign immunity is an affirma-
tive defense which must be pleaded, thus the burden is on the foreign state to produce
sufficient evidence in support of its immunity claim.
7. These exceptions are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). They include: (1) a for-
eign state's waiver of its immunity (§ 1605(a)(1); (2) an action based on a foreign state's
commercial activity carried on in the United States (§ 1605(a)(2)); (3) any case in which
rights in property taken in violation of international law are at issue and the property is
in the United States (§ 1605(a)(3)); (4) any case in which rights in property in the
United States acquired by succession or gift or immovable property are at issue (§
1605(a)(4); and (5) an action based upon the tortious act or omission of a foreign state or
their employees (§ 1605(a)(5)).
8. See HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
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in the United States.9 This is known as the "immovable property" ex-
ception and is codified in section 1605(a)(4) of the FSIA.'0
Recently, in Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican
States" the "immovable property" exception was invoked against
Mexico.' The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, in deciding that Mexico was immune from United States juris-
diction, 3 stated that the exception was not to be given the most ex-
pansive interpretation possible, but rather was to be narrowly
construed.14 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that the phrase "rights in im-
movable property," as set forth in the FSIA,'5 was not intended to en-
compass rights to compensation traceable historically to title disputes
over United States land which has been settled by international agree-
ment."6 The D.C. Circuit also reaffirmed an established principle of the
"tortious act" exception 7 of the FSIA, namely, that the tort in whole
must occur in the United States for the exception to be applicable.'8
II. BACKGROUND
The case involves a class action brought by the Asociacion de
Reclamantes and six individuals, seeking compensation from the
9. There is only one other reported case applying the immovable property exception.
See County Board of Arlington County v. Government of the German Democratic Re-
public, Civil No. 78-293-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1404 (1978).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1982) provides:
(a) a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States or of the States in any case
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession
or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue.
Id.
11. 735 F.2d at 1517.
12. Id. at 1520.
13. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court that the FSIA grants
immunity to Mexico. Id. at 1520. See 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1983).
14. 735 F.2d at 1521.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1982).
16. 735 F.2d at 1523.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(1982). Section 1605(a)(5) in part creates an exception to
foreign sovereign immunity for cases not otherwise encompassed by the exception for a
foreign state's commercial activity (§ 1605(a)(2)), in which money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious conduct or omission of that
foreign state. It also applies to officials and employees of the foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office of employment. Id.
18. See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In
re Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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United Mexican States ("Mexico") for its alleged taking and conver-
sion of certain land grant related claims possessed by plaintiffs or their
ancestors.' 9 The plaintiffs claim to be or to represent the successors in
interest to recipients of 433 land grants from the King of Spain or the
Republic of Mexico 0 that are now located in Texas.2 ' The original
grantees, Spanish and Mexican citizens, were allegedly driven from this
land and divested of title by the United States and Texas after the
Mexican-American War.2 2 These actions occurred in spite of provisions
contained in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo" which explicitly
protected those landowners' rights to title and use of the land2 4 Thus,
at this time, these landowners may have possessed actionable claims
against the United States.2 5
In the early 1920's, a new Mexican Government espoused the 433
land claims and asserted these against the United States." In 1923,
Mexico and the United States concluded the Treaty on General
Claims.2 7 This treaty created a General Claims Commission which
would evaluate the claims of each country's nationals.2 In 1936, the
authority for the Commission to evaluate claims expired and none of
19. Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). As will be discussed later, this is the lower court's decision which found juris-
diction lacking under the FSIA, and alternatively, that the act of state doctrine pre-
cluded adjudication of the merits.
20. Id. at 1192 n.1. The appellate court noted that Mexico has not contested the
historical account proffered by the appellants. 735 F.2d at 1519 n.1.
21. The land grants in question consist of approximately 12 million acres of land
lying principally between the Rio Grande and the Nuces River in South Texas. 561 F.
Supp. at 1192 n.1.
22. Id. at 1192.
23. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, art. VIII, 9
Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207, at 929.
24. Pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, sovereignty over Texas was trans-
ferred from Mexico to the United States. Id. at 922. krticle VIII provides that Mexican
citizens could remain on the land and retain title as Mexican or American citizens. The
present owners, their heirs and all Mexicans that acquired the property by contract,
would enjoy the guarantees with respect to the property as if it belonged to United
States citizens. Id. at 929-30.
25. Claims could have been asserted for restoration of title and possession but, as the
court notes, the complaint did not assert that they were ever pursued in United States
courts. 735 F.2d at 1519.
26. Id.
27. Treaty on General Claims, Sept. 8, 1923, United States-Mexico, 43 Stat. 1730,
T.S. No. 678.
28. Id. Art. I at 1730. The Commission was directed to quantify the number and size
of the claims, and to the extent the aggregate claims of the citizens of one nation ex-
ceeded the other nation's claims, the difference would be paid sovereign to sovereign. Id.
At. Ix at IT1 5o
29. 735 F.2d at 1519 n.2. The Commission heard cases until 1931. In 1934 the Com-
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the 433 land claims had been evaluated. 0 In 1938, however, new nego-
tiations had begun between the two sovereigns and the land claims
were espoused again.3 1 These negotiations ended in 1941, yielding the
Treaty on Final Settlement of Certain Claims.3 2 In sum, the Treaty
required each sovereign to assume the obligation of satisfying the es-
poused claims of its own nationals.3 By the Treaty's terms, Mexico
released the United States from liability on all claims, including the
433 Texas land claims.8
4
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs filed their initial class action in September of 1981
based upon Mexico's failure to satisfy a single claim in the more than
forty years since the 1941 Treaty was signed.35 They asserted that, de-
spite Mexico's acknowledging its obligation many times,36 no legisla-
tion providing for compensation had been enacted. 37 It was argued by
plaintiffs that Mexico's release of the United States from liability on
the 433 land claims, in exchange for valuable considerations,38 consti-
tuted a use and taking of those claims by Mexico for its own public
purposes.3 9 As a result, they claim Mexico became obligated to pay
just, effective and prompt consideration. 40
The case came before the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia on a motion to dismiss. 41 Mexico asserted that the
mission was replaced by two claims appraisers whose authority to evaluate claims ex-
pired in 1936. See General Claims Protocol, Apr. 24, 1934, United States-Mexico, 49
Stat. 3531, E.A.S. No. 57.
30. 735 F.2d at 1519.
31. Id. The Court stated that these negotiations were precipitated by Mexico's ex-
propriation of oil producing property, owned by United States citizens without guaran-
tees with respect to the property as if it belonged to United States citizens. Id. at 929-30.
32. Nov. 19, 1941, United States-Mexico, 56 Stat. 1347, T.S. No. 980 [hereinafter
1941 Treaty].
33. Id. art. III, at 1350.
34. Id. art. I, at 1348.
35. 561 F. Supp. at 1193.
36. Id. Mexico acknowledged its obligation by presidential decree shortly after the
treaty was signed. Decree of President Camacho, Dec. 9, 1941, published in El Diaro
Oficial, Dec. 31, 1941. In addition, assurances of payment are alleged to have been made
as recently as 1970. Id.
37. Id.
38. The total amount of claims released against Mexico was in excess of $193 million.
561 F. Supp. at 1192.
39. 561 F. Supp. at 1192-93.
40. Id. at 1193.
41. Id. at 1191. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6) (1984).
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court lacked jurisdiction"' to hear the case and, as a sovereign, was im-
mune from the court's power.' s Plaintiffs contended that jurisdiction
existed under the FSIA "immovable property"" and "tortious act" ex-
ceptions"' and sought to recover damages from the Mexican sovereign
for its uncompensated taking of the Texas land claims."
The district court held that jurisdiction was lacking and dismissed
the complaint. 47 The court stated that the "immovable property" ex-
ception contained two independent triggering clauses. 4 The first clause
dealt with the rights in property in the United States acquired by suc-
cession or gift and the second related to rights in "immovable prop-
erty" situated in the United States.'
In connection with the first clause, plaintiffs argued it was in-
tended to deal with all kinds of property acquired by succession or
gift." The second clause, they argued, was drafted to deal with rights
in "immovable property."5' These contentions were one of two argu-
ments proffered by plaintiffs.2
In their second argument, they alternatively asserted that their
claims arose from rights in "immovable property," as well as inherited
intangible property located in the United States (i.e., claims). 3 The
district court disagreed with both arguments."
In their first argument, plaintiffs tried to establish that their
claims were a "usufructuary interest"5 and thus a right in "immovable
property." This argument assumed that they had a colorable legal right
to title in 1923 when Mexico and the United States considered the
claims.' s The court noted, however, that plaintiffs never alleged they
had title to the land in 1923 or that they attempted to regain title in a
42. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604 (1982), the FSIA provides the sole basis for
subject matter jurisdiction against foreign states.
43. 561 F. Supp. 1191.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1650(a)(5).
46. 561 F. Supp. 1191.
47. Id. at 1201.
48. Id. at 1196.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4).
50. Including real, personal or intangible property, 561 F. Supp. at 1196.
51. They assert that both clauses apply to its claims against Mexico. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In civil law, a "usufructuary interest" refers to the right of enjoying a thing, the
property of which is vested in another and to draw from it all the profit, utility and
advantage which it may produce. See LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. ARTS. 535 (West 1980).
56. 561 F. Supp. at 1196.
1986]
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legal forum prior to that time.5 7 Because the underlying controversy
did not involve an action to quiet title or to recover money derivative
of real property rights, the court held that the claims involved intangi-
ble property rights created through the diplomatic process and not
rights in "immovable property."s5
As to plaintiffs' second argument, that their claims fell within the
meaning of inherited property, the court stated "the plaintiffs adopt an
expansive interpretation. 59 This interpretation of the FSIA section
would state that any claim involving inherited property (real, personal
or intangible) would be excepted from the sovereign immunity rule.6 0
The court asserted that this interpretation would be contrary to the
FSIA's purpose,61 namely, codifying the restrictive principles of sover-
eign immunity.6 2
In addition, the district court found the "tortious act"63 exception
inapplicable because the Mexican conduct at issue fell within the "dis-
cretionary act"" exception to section 1605(a)(5).6 The plaintiffs rea-
soned that Mexico assumed the duty to compensate them in the 1941
Treaty66 and that the continuing failure to provide compensation con-
stituted a conversion of their claims. 7 The court described the evalua-
tion, financing and payment of these claims as judgments that raise
substantial and serious questions of fiscal policy and the allocation of
limited resources.6 8 The court reasoned that these considerations were
high level policy judgments requiring deference to the expertise and
57. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejects this analysis be-
cause such allegations did not appear in the amended complaint. See 735 F.2d at 1520
n.4.
58. 561 F. Supp. at 1197. Cf. Matter of Rio Grande, 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1160
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (a liability compensation fund is not real estate and thus not immovable
property).
59. Id.
60. The court states that every dispute with a foreign sovereign necessarily involves
these kinds of intangible rights. Id.
61. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
62. 561 F. Supp. at 1197.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) provides that the tort exception shall not apply to: (A) any
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused. (emphasis
supplied).
65. 561 F. Supp. at 1198.
66. See supra note 23.
67. 561 F. Supp. 1197.
68. Id. at 1198. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION [hereinafter
HENKIN] (1972) (the court has refused to scrutinize any settlement and has affirmed that
Congress has discretion to decide whether, and how, and to what extent compensation is
due to the original claimants). Id. at 262.
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discretion of the sovereign." Thus, the district court decided to defer
under 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(5)(a)" to the expertise of the Mexican
Government, regardless of whether that judgment was an abuse of dis-
cretion.7' Therefore, the alleged conversion of the land claims extended
beyond the parameters of federal subject matter jurisdiction." More-
over, the court noted an additional basis for declining jurisdiction,
namely, that even assuming arguendo that Mexico converted the
claims and committed a tortious act, the tort occurred in Mexico and
did not affect property in the United States.
3
The district court also held, alternatively, that the act of state doc-
trine74 would prohibit adjudication of the merits of the complaint even
if jurisdiction existed." The court stated that judicial intervention
would directly interfere with the historical authority of the executive
and legislative branches in negotiating, signing and ratifying treaties.76
This is because there is a long history of governmental action compen-
sating United States citizens out of foreign assets in this country for
wrongs done them by foreign governments abroad. 77
The plaintiffs appealed the order of the district court to the
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.78 Judge
Scalia, writing for the court, characterized the case solely as one of
statutory interpretation." The issue was framed by the court as fol-
lows: "Whether Congress, in enacting the FSIA, intended the phrase
'rights in immovable property' to be broad enough to encompass rights
69. 561 F. Supp. at 1198.
70. See supra note 64.
71. 561 F. Supp. at 1198.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)(1982). Because the tortious act exception is inapplicable, the
court lacks jurisdiction.
73. 561 F. Supp. at 1198.
74. The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine appears in the Supreme
Court's decision in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment of the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reasons of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id.
75. 561 F. Supp. at 1200.
76. The court wanted to avoid a ruling that would hold Mexico in violation of Mexi-
can law for failing to compensate plaintiffs. Such a ruling, stated the court, would seri-
ously damage the lawful and apparent authority of the United States negotiators. Id. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
77. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 898 (1966).
78. 735 F.2d 1517.
79. Id. at 1518.
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to compensation traceable historically to disputes over title to Ameri-
can land, which disputes have been settled by international agree-
ment."80 The D.C. Circuit decided that compensation claims were not
intended to be included within the parameters of the FSIA excep-
tions.8  Because the court lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA, it had
neither need nor power to reach the act of state doctrine.8" Thus, Mex-
ico was granted immunity and the order of the district court was af-
firmed on the sole basis of the FSIA.8 3
IV. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TIIE FSIA
Sovereign immunity is an internationally recognized doctrine
under which the courts of one state will decline to exercise jurisdiction
over another state without its consent.8 " At first, the absolute theory of
immunity prevailed, affording foreign states immunity from all suits.
8 5
But, with an increase in the participation of states and individuals in
commercial activities with foreign entities, a trend developed toward
restricting the scope of state immunity to suits based on foreign acts.
86
This "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity was formally adopted
by the United States in 1952.87 Under this restrictive theory, foreign
sovereigns are accorded immunity with regard to their public acts (ac-
tiones jure imperii), but not with respect to their commercial acts (ac-
tiones jure gestionis).88 There remained, however, substantial uncer-
tainty as to the outcome of any given case, mainly due to the absence
of a consistent method for distinguishing between public acts and pri-
80. Id. at 1520.
81. Id. at 1524.
82. Id. at 1520.
83. Id.
84. HOUSE REPoRT, supra note 6, at S.
85. Kahale, Characterizing Nationalizations for Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 392 (1982-83).
See also The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 116. (recognition of immunity is
supported by the law practice of nations).
86. Kahale, supra note 85, at 392. See Victory Trans. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abas-
tecimientos, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (restrictive theory is designed to "accommo-
date the interest of individuals doing business with foreign governments in having their
legal rights determined by the courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being
free to perform certain political acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hin-
drance of defending the propriety of such acts before foreign courts.").
87. The Department of State adopted this position in the "Tate Letter." Letter from
Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Philip Perlman, Acting At-
torney General of the United States (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984 (1952),
reprinted in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 647 (1976).
88. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
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vate acts.8 '
It was with these difficulties in mind that Congress codified the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the FSIA, in 1976.9 Con-
gress selected the "nature of the act" test for determining whether a
particular act was public or private.9' The FSIA sets forth the general
rule that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States,""2 and then subjects this rule to exceptions
for specific categories of cases." It is important to keep in mind that
the FSIA provides the sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction over
suits against foreign states. 4
Two of the rarely employed exceptions to sovereign immunity that
apply to both public and private acts are the "immovable property""'
and "tortious act"' exceptions. Turning first to the "immovable prop-
erty" exception, each of these exceptions will be discussed."7
The term "rights in immovable property" is susceptible to many
different meanings depending upon the area of law for which that
characterization of an interest may be relevant" s What is important in
this instance is what Congress meant by the phrase in the FSIA."s The
89. Kahale, supra note 85, at 393. See 336 F.2d at 358-62; The Schooner Exchange,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137-46; see also Note, Judicial Authority and Presidential Compe-
tence: Conflicting Powers Affecting Claims Against Foreign States, 3 N.Y.J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 193, 210 (1982), wherein it was stated:
Chief Justice Marshall then meticulously evaluated the facts of the case, the
principles to be applied, the need to balance the previously recognized common
interest in orderly commerce and the demands for respect by the sovereign na-
tions. In this analysis he distinguished those acts of the sovereign which were
public acts from those acts which were commercial in nature, thus foreshad-
owing the jure imperii-jure gestionis distinction, before extending immunity to
the warship.
90. The legislative history indicates that the codification of the "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity was the primary purpose of the FSIA. See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 7.
91. Kahale, supra note 85, at 393 n.13. Under this test, the nature of the act, rather
than the purpose for which it is being performed, is considered to be the controlling
factor.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
93. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1982).
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604 (1982).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (1982).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982).
97. See infra text and accompanying notes 98-120.
98. See I.G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 19,
at 74 (1980 Replacement) (immovability not a final test as between real and personal
property).
99. The court states: "[o]ur job, however, is not to give the term the most expansive
reading possible, nor to extract from different sources of law an artificial consensus defi-
nition of the term, but to determine what Congress meant by the language in this partic-
19861
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legislative history of section 1605(a)(4) states that the "immovable
property" exception was established to codify the pre-existing real
property exception to sovereign immunity recognized by international
practice.'00 As noted in other texts,'' this practice refused to extend
foreign sovereign immunity to "an action to obtain possession of or
establish a property interest in 'immovable property' located in the
territory of the state exercising jurisdiction."1 0 2 Thus, immunity is ex-
tended for claims arising out of a foreign state's ownership or posses-
sion of "immovable property" when this ownership or right to posses-
sion is not being contested." 3
The origin of this traditional exception is rooted in the fundamen-
tal policy that a territorial sovereign has a primary interest in resolving
all disputes over real property within its domain.' 0 4 Another concern is
that courts, outside of the jurisdiction where the land is located, are
not well suited to decide property interests or rights to possession re-
garding such land, especially if it is in a foreign country. 0° The excep-
tion to sovereign immunity, as well as the "local action rule,"' 0 were
by-products of these considerations.
The FSIA "immovable property" exception, like the traditional
real property exception it was meant to codify, is directed to disputes
directly involving property interests or rights to possession."0 7 This is
borne out by the examples used by Congress to illustrate the types of
actions to which section 1605(a)(4) is applicable; suits involving "ques-
tions of ownership, rent, servitudes and similar matters."' 0 8 This is also
consistent with the single reported case interpreting section 1605(a)(4),
County Board of Arlington County v. Government of the German
ular statute." 735 F.2d at 1521.
100. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 6, at 20.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 68(b) (1965) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT]. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
455(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
102. Id. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20.
103. RESTATEMENT, supra note 102, at § 68 comment d. An example is a negligence
suit for injury suffered by a private individual while on the foreign state's property. Id.
104. F. WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 278, at 636 (3d. ed. 1905) (each State has a
fundamental policy as to the tenure of land. A sovereign cannot safely permit a foreign
power to determine title to its land).
105. See Reasor Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 523; 249 S.W.2d 994, 995,
(1952).
106. The local action rule makes the locality power exclusive and deprives other
courts of jurisdiction to settle questions involving real estate. See Griner v. Trevino, 207
S.W. 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); I.G. THOMPSON, supra note 98, § 24, at 24 (courts of one
state cannot create an interest in real estate situated in another state).
107. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20.
108. Id.
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Democratic Republic. 0 9 In that case, a foreign sovereign was being
sued by a county taxing authority for delinquent real estate taxes on
property located in the county."' A prayer for declaratory judgment
that the property should be subject to the lien of the county, as pro-
vided by the state statute, was added to the complaint."' With regard
to amenability to suit under section 1605(a)(4), the court stated,
"Whether or not the issue of rights in 'immovable property' is present
. . . the issue will be a specific matter for the court's attention in de-
termining the question of the county's lien .... ,,11
The other FSIA exception at issue in the instant case is the "tor-
tious act" exception embodied in section 1605(a)(5)." 3 As the legisla-
tive history notes, this section was directed primarily at the problem of
traffic accidents caused by officials and employees of foreign sovereigns
in the United States." 4 Thus, the "tortious act" exception denies im-
munity as to claims for personal injury or death, or for damage to or
loss of property caused by the tortious act or omission of a foreign
state or its officials." 5
Section 1605(a)(5) is ambiguous as to whether both the tort and
the injury must occur in the United States or whether the tort may
occur abroad while the injury is suffered here."' This ambiguity, ho-w-
ever, seems to go no further than the language of the text. The legisla-
tive history makes clear that the "tortious act or omission must occur
within the jurisdiction of the United States."' 7 As one court stated,
[T]he briefest consideration of the purpose of [section 1605(a)(5)]
shows . . . both the tort and the injury must occur in the United
States" for section 1605(a)(5) to be applicable."18 It is against this
background of two FSIA exceptions, that the D.C. Circuit examined
the claims of appellants in the instant case."'
109. County Board of Arlington County v. Government of the German Democratic
Republic, No. 79-293-k (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 1978), reprinted inr 17 I.L.M. 1404 (1978).
110. Id. at 1404.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1405. In Arlington County, the county lien would be the servitude.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
114. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21-22.
115. Id. at 22. The official or employee must be acting within the scope of his official
capacity. Id.
116. See Persinger, 729 F.2d at 842. Cf. Frolova, 558 F. Supp. at 362 (act or omission
must occur in the United States) with Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,
674 (D.D.C. 1980) (only the tortious injury need occur in the United States).
117. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
118. Persinger, 729 F.2d at 842. Accord Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567 (stating that the
tort in the whole must occur in the United States).
119. 735 F.2d at 1520-25.
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V. ANALYSIS OF CASE
Judge Scalia found it useful to review the manner in which the
appellants' claims originated to illustrate that they were not of the
character involving property interests or possessions to which the "im-
movable property" exception attached. 20 The court noted that the
principle of a sovereign possessing the absolute power to assert the pri-
vate claims of its nationals against another was well established under
international law. 2 ' The sovereign was not required to obtain the con-
sent of the national (i.e., claimholder)12 2 and the fact that this claim
had been put forward afforded a complete defense for the defendant
sovereign in any suit brought by the private national. 12 3 Once the sov-
ereign had stated the claim, that sovereign had wide-ranging discretion
in disposing of that claim. 2 ' Final settlement between the sovereigns
wiped out the underlying private debt,125 releasing the defendant sov-
ereign from all obligations including the possible1 26 legal obligation of
Mexico to its nationals, under Mexican law, and Mexico's legal obliga-
tion that arose from the wrongful taking12 7 and settled by the 1941
Treaty. 2 8 The crucial distinction made by the court was that the legal
obligation settled by the 1941 Treaty was "owed by a different sover-
eign" 9 and derived from the application of different law to entirely dis-
similar and distinct facts." '
It is against this background that the court stated, "the compensa-
tion rights asserted here are not remotely 'rights in immovable prop-
erty.' ""3 Although the phrase has been afforded an expansive scope
elsewhere, 13 2 the court did not accept the appellants' expansive reading
120. Id. at 1522.
121. Id. at 1523. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 102, at § 212 (the United States has
discretion as to whether to espouse a national's claim for injury by conduct attributable
to a foreign state that is wrongful under international law. See also lIENKIN, supra note
68, at 262-63.
122. 735 F.2d at 1523. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 102, at § 213.
123. 735 F.2d at 1523. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 102, at § 205 (settlement by a
state of which an injured alien is a national . . . is effectively a defense to an interna-
tional claim asserted by the state against that state responsible for the injury).
124. Id. (a sovereign may compromise the claim, seek to enforce it or waive it en-
tirely). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (President Carter
espoused the claims of United States nationals against Iran).
125. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 262.
126. 735 F.2d at 1523.
127. Id. (wrongful under either the United States or Texas law or the 1941 Treaty).
128. Id. See 1941 Treaty, supra note 32.
129. Id. (the obligation was assumed by Mexico).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN., art. 535 (West 1980)(at civil law the phrase in-
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of the phrase included in the FSIA exception. 3  Rather, the court
viewed its responsibility as one of determining what Congress meant
by the language in the particular statute at bar.1 -4 The court, after its
reading of the legislative history which clarified the FSIA purposes,3 5
decided that a narrower construction of the term was intended.' 36
Because the compensation claims asserted by appellants' were not
property interests in real estate,13 7 nor possessory rights, nor rights to
payment of money secured by an interest in land, the claims were not
"rights in immovable property" within the meaning of section
1605(a)(4). s3 As the court noted, neither the title to, nor the use of,
the Texas lands can possibly be affected by the outcome of appellants'
action." Any questions of title, possession and even compensation as
between the United States and appellants' predecessors in interest
were extinguished after the 1941 Treaty.'
The court also rejected the appellants' reliance on the Supreme
Court case Comegys v. Vasse. 4L The appellants relied on that case for
the proposition that "payment [of a claim] under a claims settlement
treaty . . [is properly viewed as] an indemnification for the violation
of a preexisting property right.""'14 Although conceding that this was
true, the appellate court stated that the issue, whether the right to in-
demnification was in the nature of a real property right for FSIA pur-
poses," was not resolved. In Comegys, the United States was in the
same position as Mexico in the instant case.' 4 The United States had
raised claims against Spain and settled them creating an obligation to
indemnify the original claimholder."15 Before the United States
cludes leases, licenses, rents, mineral rights, easements and royalties). See also TiioMP-
SON, supra note 98, § 19 at 83. Thompson notes that in the law of eminent domain the
compensation awarded for the compulsory conversion of real estate "will be treated as
real estate until the owner, being sui juris, accepts it as personal property." Id.
133. 735 F.2d at 1521.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
136. 735 F.2d at 1521.
137. The court gives examples of property interests, i.e., a leasehold, easement or
servitude. Id. at 1523.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Court also notes that, although appellant's predecessors in interest pos-
sessed a claim to title and possession and a right in immovable property, these were
extinguished by the 1941 Treaty. Id.
140. Id.
141. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828).
142. 735 F.2d at 1523 (citing Appellants' Brief at 15).
143. Id.
144. Comegys, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 193.
145. Id. at 212.
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brought the action, the defendant, a claimholder, made an assignment
in bankruptcy. " 6 The issue was whether indemnification should be
paid to the original claimholder or to the assignee.1 4 7 The Supreme
Court held that the indemnification was not a "donation or gratu-
ity,""" but rather sufficiently attributable to the claim against Spain
that indemnification should go to the assignee, the new claimholder.1
4 9
The D.C. Circuit stated that this second claim for indemnification
was not identical to the first claim received through the assignment,
either in amount or in its general character as a real estate claim.15 As
such, the character of the claim was not a "right in immovable prop-
erty" for the purpose of the FSIA.'5 ' In sum, the court held that be-
cause appellants' claims would not affect property interests in, or
rights to possession of, land located in the United States, the compen-
sation claims were not "rights in immovable property," within the
meaning of section 1605(a)(4)." s"
The D.C. Circuit also found the "tortious act" exception' " inap-
plicable to assert jurisdiction over Mexico. As stated previously,' 54 ap-
pellants argued that Mexico's failure to compensate them for its use
and taking of their land claims was a violation of international, domes-
tic and presumably Mexican law and thus ' tortious within the scope
of section 1605(a)(5).1"
The court determined that the conduct complained of lacked the
required nexus with the United States, 5 ' namely, that the tortious act
occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States. 58 The thrust of
appellants' tort claim was the failure to compensate, an omission which
can only be deemed to have occurred in Mexico.'59 The court stated
that even if the failure to compensate had the effect of retroactively
rendering the prior acts on United States soil tortious, the entire tort
146. Id. at 193.
147. Id. at 194.
148. Id. at 217.
149. Id. at 219.
150. 735 F.2d at 1524.
151. Id. (The Court also noted that Comegys differed from the instant case in that
the claim had been adjudicated and found meritorious before it was espoused). [Empha-
sis added].
152. Id.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
154. See supra note 67.
155. The tort would be conversion. 735 F.2d at 1521.
156. 735 F.2d at 1524.
157. Id.
158. See infra text and accompanying notes 117-19.
159. 735 F.2d at 1525.
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would not have occurred here.'
Again, as it did with the "immovable property" exception, the
court predominantly relied upon the primary purpose of the "tortious
act" exception.' 61 It determined that Congress did not intend to create
a broad exception encompassing all alleged torts that bear some rela-
tionship to the United States. 62 Therefore, because jurisdiction was
lacking under the FSIA, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court.6 3
There was one concurring opinion reported by Judge Edwards,
who read the court's holding as limited by and responsive to the pre-
cise and unique facts of the case.'" Judge Edwards made this clear by
stating:
The opinion did not hold that in a comtemporary setting, the
United States can lawfully expropriate property legitimately
owned by aliens in this country, consumate a treaty with a for-
eign sovereign extinguishing the alien's property rights without
compensation or consideration, and then avoid responsibility
under the Constitution or other applicable laws of this
nation.6 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's decision appears to correctly reflect the policies under-
lying the FSIA.' 6 Although on the facts of this case it would seem
equitable to allow the appellants' action to continue, the FSIA excep-
tions were intended to encompass very distinct situations.'07 To permit
courts to interpret these exceptions to their broadest parameters would
result in immunity for foreign sovereigns becoming the exception in-
stead of the rule. Thus, future parties seeking to subject a foreign sov-
ereign to a suit in the United States should expect the courts, in the
160. See Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561.
161. See infra text and accompanying notes 115-16.
162. 735 F.2d at 1525.
163. Id. See 561 F. Supp. at 1190.
164. 735 F.2d at 1525 (Edwards, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. See supra text and accompanying notes 88-94.
167. As the district court stated, "The Court is deeply troubled by the allegations in
plaintiffs' complaint." 561 F. Supp. at 1200. The court continued, "For reasons unknown
to the court, . . . Mexico has allegedly failed, as the 1941 treaty provides, to promptly
evaluate the claims and provide compensation. Despite these serious concerns, the Court
holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the FSIA." Id. at
1201.
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District of Columbia at least, to apply the FSIA exceptions only in the
narrow manner intended by Congress. 68
Frank A. Oswald
168. See House REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-21.
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